In this paper we present a canonical setting that illustrates the need for explicitly modeling interactions between manufacturing and marketing/sales decisions in a rm. We consider a single rm that sells an innovative product with a given market potential and incurs lost sales when unable to supply the product due to capacity constraints. For such rms, we present a new, deterministic model of demand modi ed from the original model of Bass, that captures the e ect of sales lost due to supply constraints on future demand. We use this model to plan production and sales in the rm with the objective of maximizing total sales during the lifetime of the product. We show that the trivial, myopic sales plan that sells the maximal possible amount at each time instant is not necessarily optimal. Using Pontryagin's maximum principle we show that the structure of the optimal sales plan is of the \build-up" type in which the rm does not sell at all for a period of time (even though it incurs lost sales during this period), and builds up enough inventory to never lose sales once it begins selling. We compute the optimal build-up period. Finally, we investigate the e ects of changing model parameters, the bene ts of initial inventory and delayed roll-out, the impact of the model on capacity planning, and the e ect of competition.
Introduction
In this paper, we study a single rm that sells an innovative product with a xed market potential and incurs lost sales when unable to supply the product due to capacity constraints. The objective of the rm is to maximize total pro t during the lifetime of the product. Consider, for example, a rm producing the latest video game. This product has a short life-cycle, namely until the next, technologically superior, game is released. It is reasonable to assume that the demand for such innovative products is generated by two sources: (a) the mass-media, and (b) word about the game di using through its potential market. Bass (1969) proposed a di usion model for the demand in such a setting. In the Bass model, the instantaneous demand rate up to time t is given by n(t) = h p + q m N(t) i (m ? N(t)), where N(t) = R t 0 n(s) ds is the cumulative sales at t, m is the market potential and p; q are constants (positive and between 0 and 1) that represent the relative e ects of mass-media and word-of-mouth on the population. This model, to be described in detail later, expresses future demand as a function of the cumulative demand realized so far. A shortcoming of the Bass model is its inability to capture supply constraints. It assumes that everyone who attempted to purchase the product is the past would have been successful, and as a result, would spread positive word-of-mouth about the product. Like most rms, the manufacturer of the video game has a limitation on production capacity. In any time interval of length t, the rm can produce at most ct units of the product, where c represents the maximum production rate. Figure 1 (in Section 3) shows the plot of both the instantaneous and cumulative demand in the Bass model. As one can see, the peak demand can be quite di erent from the average demand. Production capacity is usually sized by the average demand rather than the peak, since it would be very wasteful otherwise. Thus, it is possible that when some customers attempt to purchase the product, the product may be unavailable due to production constraints. Moreover, customers who are unable to purchase may not be willing to wait for the product, especially in the light of a short life cycle. For instance in the video game example, if the product is not available customers may buy an alternate, particularly during the holiday season. Motivated by such examples, we assume that customers who show up to buy the product tend not to backlog unful lled orders during this period; that is, a customer not nding the product on the shelf results in a lost sale for the rm. Thus the cumulative sales up to time t, S(t), may be quite di erent from the cumulative demand, N(t). In such a setting, it is important that one re nes the Bass model to incorporate supply constraints. In this paper we propose a modi cation of the Bass model that takes into account supply constraints and the resulting lost sales. In proposing this modi cation, we strive to retain one very desirable feature of the Bass model: a parsimonious mathematical description. In our model, the instantaneous demand at time t is given by n(t) = h p + q m S(t) i (m ? N(t)),
where the cumulative sales S(t) satis es the production capacity constraint S(t) ct for all t. The key feature of our model is that future demand depends not only on past demand but also on realized sales.
We present a normative model aimed at qualitative insight. Using this model of demand, we determine optimal production and sales plans for the rm. Since in our model future demand depends on realized sales, and since realized sales depend on the policies employed, this problem of determining the optimal production and sales policies is a non-trivial one. An example is used to show that the notion of a \sales plan" is not vacuous in this setting. That is, one does not merely sell whatever is available. Rather, one sells according to a careful prescription. Utilizing Pontryagin's maximum principle we show the structure of the optimal sales plan is of \build up" type: there exists an initial buildup period where the rm does not sell anything, even though inventory may be available; thereafter it meets all future demand. In the build-up period, advertising and other mass media e ects (considered exogeneous and xed in our model) continue to generate demand, and the rm deliberately chooses to lose sales to these customers. We characterize precisely the duration of the build-up period, and consequently the optimal sales plan. A numerical example shows how a sales plan derived from the classical Bass model could be signi cantly inferior to the optimal sales plan based on our model. One need not take the prescription of this policy literally to see the impact of the modi ed Bass model. Despite simplifying assumptions made in the model (whose limitations are discussed in section 7), and the resulting, somewhat extreme optimal prescription, the analysis provides several interesting managerial insights that can be carried over to more general settings. In section 6 of the paper we discuss four such settings. In particular we study the impact of initial inventory on the optimal solution, the implications of the model on capacity sizing decision, the e ect of competition on the optimal policy and the insights obtained with regards to a generalized model with discounting and pricing. In each of these cases, we are able to shed light on implications of supply constraints on the optimal policy. For example, we consider the case of delayed roll-out where a rm builds up inventory before introducing the product and explicitly characterize what the starting inventory should be in order to avoid any lost sale during the product life time. Next with a numerical example, we show how using a sales plan derived from a classical Bass model could lead to incorrect decisions about capacity sizing. We also present a simple modi ed version of our model that captures di usion in a duopoly setting (although there is no notion of competition in the classical Bass model) and with a numerical example show that if one of two identical rms in a duopoly chooses to use the myopic policy, then the other rm has incentive to unilaterally deviate from the myopic policy towards a build-up policy. This seems to suggest that the myopic policy will not be part of a Nash equilibrium under the given setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss relevant literature. In section 3, we rst present the Bass model. We derive the optimal production and sales plans for the original Bass model under production capacity constraints. We show the inappropriateness of the Bass model when there are production capacity constraints, using an example. In section 4, we introduce our modi ed model, explaining and justifying the modi cations. In section 5 we use a numerical example to motivate the structure of the optimal policy and prove it using Pontryagin's maximum principle. We discuss several managerial insights related to the model and study the e ect of changing model parameters on the optimal solution. In section 6, we discuss four variants and extensions of the problem namely, initial inventory and delayed roll-out, capacity sizing, competition, and, price and cash discounting, and provide insights on those generalized versions of the problem. Finally in section 7 we conclude by discussing the limitations of the present setting and future work.
2 Related Literature Eliashberg and Steinberg (1993) provide an overview of the research that integrates marketing and manufacturing decisions. They indicate that researchers have in the past tried to address issues in two di erent ways-either by considering centralized control of both units or through mechanism design (incentive and penalties) for the two units. Our approach in this paper is to assume that a central unit has control over both the units and we introduce and analyze models where the demand is explained through a di usion process.
First introduced in Bass (1969) , di usion models of demand have been studied for a long time in the marketing literature to determine optimal timing for product introduction, pricing and advertisement among other issues (see Mahajan et. al. 1990) . In the Bass model, the instantaneous demand at any time n(t) is given by n(t) = h p + q m N(t) i (m? N(t)) where N(t) is the cumulative sales at t, m is the market potential and p; q are constants that represent the relative e ects of mass-media and word-of-mouth on the population. Several researchers in marketing have worked on modifying the Bass model to incorporate advertising, changes in market potential, multi-stage and exible di usion among others. Table 3 of Mahajan et. al. (1990) provides an extensive review of such modi cations of the Bass model. One of the shortcomings of the Bass model is its inability to model supply constraints. This shortcoming has been highlighted in an indirect way in literature. Several researchers in marketing have found that when they estimate the Bass model parameters p and q using industry data the estimate for p is inexplicably low, and sometimes an invalid negative value. Most of the researchers have attributed this e ect to supply constraints. Simon and Sebastian (1987) note in their paper that supply constraints may have distorted the parameter estimates obtained by them using the Bass model. However, most of the research on the Bass model has avoided explicit modeling of supply side constraints (such as capacity restrictions, inventory handling capabilities etc.). Jain et. al. (1991) consider supply constraints and present a modi ed Bass model where customers wait for future delivery in a queue if they do not get the product. This is often referred to as backlogging in the Operations Management literature where customers wait if inventory is not available and are provided the product when the inventory becomes available. In many settings, if the rm cannot provide the product due to supply constraints, the customer may choose not to purchase the product at all and the sale may be lost (also called lost sales in inventory literature). We are not aware of any di usion models in the literature for such a setting. Moreover, most of the modi cations of the Bass model are for forecasting or parameter estimation purposes and not for the design of optimal policies as studied in this paper.
There have been very few papers in operations management where the underlying demand is modeled using the Bass model. Kurawarwala and Matsuo (1996) consider a problem where the underlying demand is given by a Bass model but the parameters of the model are unknown. They study the problem of minimizing the total expected holding and stock-out costs during the horizon. However, they too do not take into account any supply constraints in their model. The paucity of operations management papers on this subject seem to be due to the fact that the Bass model per se does not take into account any operational measure like production capacity or inventory level, and hence decouples the marketing/sales and the operations issues. In this paper we provide a model and analysis that attempts to bridge this gap.
3 Production and Sales Plans under the Classical Bass Model
In this section, we present the classical Bass model of demand for innovative products. Assuming that this model is still valid when there are production capacity constraints, we derive the optimal production and sales plan for a rm attempting to maximize sales. We assume that the customers who request a product and are not provided one immediately never attempt to purchase the product again. That is, we make the assumption of lost sales. Having derived the optimal production and sales plans, we use the properties of the optimal solution, especially the resulting lost sales, to argue that the Bass model is inappropriate to the setting we consider. In the Section 4 we provide a modi cation of the Bass model that is more appropriate to our setting.
The Classical Bass Model
The basic assumption behind the Bass model is that purchasers of an innovative product are in uenced by two means of communication { mass media and word-of-mouth. Based on this assumption, one can assume that the the rate at which purchases take place among the fraction of the market that have not yet purchased the product 1 , is comprised of two components { one due to mass-media that is not a ected by the cumulative fraction of purchases upto the present time (corresponding to purchasers who are termed innovators), and another due to word-of-mouth that is directly proportional to the cumulative fraction of purchases upto the present time (corresponding to purchasers who are termed imitators). Thus, the model is in uenced by two parameters p and q, where p represents the impact of mass-media in uences (also called the coe cient of innovation), and q represents the impact of the cumulative fraction who have already purchased the product (also called the coe cient of imitation). Further assumptions in this model are that there is a xed market potential and there is a single rm that sells the product at a xed price. As a result, everyone in the market eventually buys the product. It is also assumed that there are no repeat purchases by the buyers. For further details on the Bass model and its variants in marketing literature, see the survey paper by Mahajan et. al. (1990) . We summarize the notation below. Let m: total market potential for the product during its life cycle, n(t): instantaneous demand for the product at = p + q m N(t): In the above equation, the rst term on the right hand side (p) represents the constant contribution of mass-media, and hence is independent of the cumulative fraction of purchases up to time t and the second term ( q m N(t) ) represents the contribution of the word-of-mouth spread by those that have purchased the product already, and hence is directly proportional to the cumulative fraction of purchases up to time t, N(t) m . We can use the fact that N(t) = mF(t) to arrive at the following equation, which we will call the \classical Bass model of demand" in the sequel.
The classical Bass model gives rise to instantaneous and cumulative demand curves as shown in Figure 1 . The parameter choices for the curves plotted in Figure 1 are m = 3000, p = 0:03, q = 0:4. The instantaneous demand starts o mainly due to the e ect of innovators. Then it rapidly grows as the e ect of imitators kicks in, reaches a maximum value and then decreases and nally tends to zero. The following lemma summarizes some useful properties related to the classical Bass model. Proof. See Mahajan et. al. (1990) .
Production/Sales Plans under Capacity Constraints
We now consider the problem of nding the optimal production and sales plans for a rm whose demand for a single product is generated by the classical Bass model (1), when that rm is constrained by production capacity. Let us consider a case where the rm has a xed production capacity (i.e., maximal production rate) c at all times. We assume that the objective is to minimize the total lost sales during the product life-cycle. Since this di ers from the usual objective in operational planning problems, we need to justify this choice further. We assume that the physical inventory holding cost over the horizon is small enough so that it is bene cial for the rm to hold a unit in inventory for the entire life cycle of the product rather than to lose a sale. For products with very short life cycles and high margins this assumption is reasonable. We also ignore the time value of money and its consequent e ects such as the delay between when a product is produced and when it is sold (that results in a nancial inventory holding cost) for the same reason { that the horizons of interest are su ciently short for these e ects to be negligible. Under these two assumptions, with a xed market potential, the problem of maximizing pro ts over the product life-cycle is equivalent to maximizing the realized sales over the life-cycle of the product. We also assume that inventory that never gets sold also does not cost the rm anything. This is without loss of generality because we will always be able to modify our optimal solutions so that they never stock any inventory beyond some nite time horizon. Let S(t) denote the cumulative sales up to time t. The joint production and sales planning problem for this setting can be formulated as follows. Choose instantaneous production x(t) and instantaneous sales levels s(t) so as to
(5) along with the constraints s(t) n(t); (6) s(t); x(t) 0; (7) x(t) c;
In the above formulation, _ N(t) and _ S(t) represent the derivatives of cumulative demand and cumulative sales with respect to t. Equation (5) speci es how future demand is generated and is a direct consequence of the classical Bass model (1). Constraints (6) and (7) constrain the instantaneous sales to be non-zero and to be less than the instantaneous demand. Constraints (7) and (8) constrain the instantaneous production to be non-zero and to be less than the production capacity c. The last constraint (9) merely says that the cumulative sales up to any time t, S(t) is no larger than the cumulative production up to that time.
The solution to the above control problem is quite straight forward. Since there is no cost to stocking, one optimal production plan is to produce as much as we can possibly sell, i.e., m, as quickly as possible, i.e., at rate c. Furthermore, under this production plan, we know that the cumulative production up to any time t is ct for all t 2 0; m c ].
Also, since S(t) is less than m for all t, we can simplify (9) to S(t) ct for all t:
As sales cannot a ect future demand, the optimal sales plan is to sell as much as possible as soon as possible. This observation, combined with the dynamics of n(t) and N(t) laid out in Lemma 1, yields the following result.
Lemma 2 An optimal production plan for the problem (2-10) is
x(t) = c for all t 2 0; m c ];
and p(t) = 0 for all t > m c . An optimal sales plan is
where t 1 = infft > 0 : N(t) > ctg. If t 1 < 1, then t 2 = infft > t 1 : n(t) < cg. If t 1 = 1, then there are no lost sales, and s(t) = n(t) for all t > 0.
Proof. We consider the optimal control problem (2-10). The Hamiltonian associated with this control problem is
where i (t) for i = 1; 2; 3 are the co-state variables associated with the dynamics equations (3), (4), and (5) respectively. Note that H is a ne in the control s(t). Hence, using the Pontryagin Maximum principle (cf.
Hestenes 7]), we know that any optimal choice of s(t) must satisfy
n(t) if @H @s > 0 and S(t) < ct; min(c; n(t)) if @H @s > 0 and S(t) = ct and 0 otherwise; (12) from which we conclude that the only possible choices are 0, c, or the instantaneous demand n(t). Now let us take any interval t i ; t j ] where the optimal instantaneous sales rate is s(t) = 0. Replace this plan by a sales plan with s(t) = min(n(t); c) in that interval t i ; t j ] and is identical to the original plan everywhere else. The new sales plan incurs lower lost sales, and therefore s(t) = 0 cannot be optimal. Since the control s(t) does not e ect future demand, it is optimal to sell as much as possible at each instant of time for the above problem. Further, using Lemma 1 we can show that either (a) N(t) < ct for all t, in which case s(t) = n(t) for all t, or (b) there exist two time instants t 1 and t 2 > t 1 such that N(t 1 ) = ct 1 , n(t) > c for all t 2 t 1 ; t 2 ), n(t 2 ) = c, and n(t) < c for all t > t 2 . For t t 1 , since S(t) N(t) < ct, the maximum instantaneous sales rate possible at any instant is s(t) = n(t), while the maximum sales possible at any instant is s(t) = c in the interval t 1 t t 2 . After t 2 , since n(t) < c for all t > t 2 , we have s(t) = n(t). Thus we obtain the result. 2
That is, under the optimal selling plan, one of two things happen. Either there is enough capacity so that for all t, N(t) ct. In this case, the classical Bass model works ne, and there is no real need for deviating from the myopic plans. This is the less interesting case. Also, to avoid stocking unnecessarily, we can use x(t) = s(t) = n(t) for all t in this case. In the more interesting case, there is a time t 1 after which N(t) exceeds the line ct. Up to time t 1 , one sells as much as demanded, i.e., S(t) = N(t) and the remaining product ct ? S(t) is stored as inventory. At t 1 all the inventory is depleted, and one is forced to sell only as much as could possibly be produced. Eventually, at t 2 , the instantaneous demand drops below c and from then, one sells the instantaneous demand. In order to avoid stocking unnecessarily, we can modify our production plan so that x(t) = c for all t t 2 above, and then set x(t) = s(t) = n(t) for all t > t 2 . Figure 2 illustrates this situation for the choice of parameters m = 3000, c = 50, p = 0:03, q = 0:4. As Figure 2 shows, there is a considerable amount of lost sales under the optimal myopic policy. In fact, more than 70% (2169 to be exact) of the prospective demand is lost under the optimal policy. These represent customers who showed up but did not nd an available product to purchase. Since we cannot slow down demand, we are forced to incur lost sales. We explore the implications of this in detail in the next section. relax some of the assumptions made in the Bass model. In this section, we propose yet another modi cation of the Bass model that attempts to relax one assumption that is particularly inappropriate in a setting with supply constraints. As illustrated above, it is possible that a large number of lost sales are incurred when there are capacity constraints. It is unreasonable to assume that these customers, despite having being denied a sale, would continue to spread word about the product. It is far more reasonable that any positive word-of-mouth e ects would be due to only those customers who actually purchased a product. Consequently we are forced to reexamine the basic hazard function behind the Bass model. Recall that in the classical Bass model we have f(t) 1 ? F(t) = p + q m N(t): The rst term on the right hand side above, which represents the demand generated by mass-media alone is of course una ected by sales, lost or realized. The second term, on the other hand, says that the word-of-mouth e ect is proportional to the cumulative demand. But in light of the example we considered in the previous section, it is far more reasonable to assume that word of mouth spreads through people who have had experience with using the product. That is, the number of people who attempt to purchase a product by imitation at a given time t is in uenced by the number of people who have successfully bought the product upto time t and not necessarily by all the people who demanded the product upto time t. Thus the word-of-mouth e ect is better represented as being proportional to the cumulative sales S(t). Thus, we propose the following modi cation to the Bass model. In the modi ed model, the hazard function at time t is given by f(t) 1 ? F(t) = p + q m S(t); and consequently we arrive at the model (hereafter referred to as the modi ed Bass model) for instantaneous demand n(t),
In deriving (13) we have attempted to retain one of the most useful features of the classical Bass model: a parsimonious analytical representation. Also note that in the modi ed Bass model, the rm's past sales, and consequently its production and sales plans directly impact the future demand for the product. This is a mixed blessing. It indeed connects production, sales, and inventory, that are usually operational issues in a rm, with future demand, usually a marketing issue. Thus, it provides a canonical model of marketing/manufacturing coordination. The ip side is that it makes the problem of nding the optimal production and sales plans much more challenging. The need for simplicity of the objective function is particularly evident in this model. Let us assume as before that the objective is still given by (2). That is, minimizing lost sales over the product life cycle is still our objective. As noted in the discussion before Lemma 2, an optimal production plan is trivial to determine for this objective. Since there are no inventory holding costs, and no costs to wasting inventory, one optimal production plan is still to make the entire market potential m as soon as possible, i.e., in m c time units by producing at capacity until the m units are produced. The optimal sales problem is, of course, no longer trivial since past sales a ect future demand. Thus, it may actually be optimal not to follow the myopic selling plans that sells as much as it can. The problem of determining the optimal sales plan analogous to (2-10) now becomes min s(t);0 t 1 J = N(1) ? S(1) (14) s:t: _ N(t) = n(t) 
5 The Optimal Sales Plan under the modi ed Bass model
In this section we rst present an example to show how an intuitive myopic sales plan (that sells as much as it can as soon as it can) performs and compare its performance to a policy of the build-up type. Subsequently, we prove that an optimal plan of the build-up type always exists and explicitly compute the length of the build-up period. Finally, we discuss the results of a computational study aimed at understanding the e ect of model parameters on the optimal solution.
An Example
Consider the example of a product whose market potential is m = 3000 units and whose coe cient of innovation p = 0:03 and coe cient of imitation q = 0:4, as suggested by Sultan et. al. (1990) . Consider the situation where this product is being manufactured at a plant whose production capacity is c = 50 units per unit time. We assume that there is no initial inventory in the system. We now compare selling plans when demand is generated by the modi ed Bass model (13). We consider two selling plans for this system. First we consider the \myopic" selling plan that sells as much as possible, as would be desirable if future demand was independent of past sales, i.e., the situation in which Lemma 2 applies. Initially, as long as N(t) ct the plan sells an amount equal to the demand. That is, N(t) = S(t).
Of course, since we have no inventory holding costs, we produce at the maximum possible rate c in 0; t]. The excess production ct ? S(t) is stored as inventory. When N(t) = S(t) = ct, there is no inventory left and from then on, s(t) = _ S(t) = c until n(t) = _ N(t) drops below c, after which the instantaneous production and sales equal the instantaneous demand, i.e., s(t) = n(t). In this, one does not sell anything for the rst t 0 time units, using the production in the period to build inventory up to ct 0 units. After this period, the plan switches to the myopic plan. That is, it sells as much as possible, i.e., the available demand until such time as its inventory depletes to zero, after which the instantaneous sales equals the maximum of the production capacity and the instantaneous demand. Figure 3 below compares the two selling plans in terms of the cumulative demand N(t) and cumulative sales S(t). Under the myopic plan the total sales = 1397 units. Thus, the myopic plan results in lost sales of 1603 units. Under the buildup plan with the switching time from no sales to sales, t 0 set to 17, the total sales = 1833 units resulting in lost sales of 1167 units. This constitutes a performance improvement of about 31%.
Managerial Insights
The example in the previous section illustrates several points.
First, and most obvious, is that the myopic selling policy need not be optimal in the modi ed Bass model. That is, in general, it is necessary to come up with a non-trivial selling plan. As a result, choosing a plan which is optimal for the classical Bass model may be quite bad when lost sales is accounted for in demand evolution.
The build-up policy can considerably out-perform the myopic policy. That is, even in a lost sales setting, it may be better to deliberately avoid selling in order to build up inventory. This result may seem counter intuitive at rst, however, there is a simple and intuitive explanation for this phenomenon. There are two important aspects to note about the build up policy -(1) sales are lost intentionally and (2) all lost sales occur in the beginning. The reason the build up policy does better than the myopic policy is that when capacity constrained, sooner or later one is going to hit the capacity limits. If we run out of capacity and incur lost sales at a time when there has been some past sales as well, we lose both the imitators as well as the innovators (as in the myopic policy) which is worse than just losing just innovators (as in the build-up policy).
The build-up policy implicitly takes care of some of the critical managerial concerns. First, the e ect of the build up policy on customer service levels is that it aims not to disappoint customers (by having all the products needed on hand) once products start selling in the market. This basically alleviates the di culties faced by rms when demand ramps up as a result of customers adopting and spreading word about the product. For example, Apple Computers was very successful recently with the IMac model in terms of customers liking the model, but faced severe problems in maintaining the appropriate level of product availability. Second, it is a common problem in innovative, short life cycle products for demand to be lumpy. A smoother demand pattern greatly simplies production problems. The build-up policy implicitly smoothes demand in that it spreads it out over a larger period of time, thus allowing a larger fraction of demand to be met under given capacity constraints. Of course, choosing the capacity level is another issue, which we postpone discussing until section 6.
Finally, the above example shows the immense bene ts the rm could attain by having inventory in the initial stages of the product life cycle. Alternatively, this could also be interpreted as how much a rm should be willing to pay for additional inventory in the early stages of the life cycle. It also points towards delaying roll-out of the product, an issue we will discuss later in section 6.
In the next section we will rigorously prove that the build-up policy is optimal, and we will describe a procedure for computing the switch over time explicitly. In doing so, the reason for choosing t 0 = 17 in the example will become apparent.
Optimality of the Build-up Policy
In this section we will prove the optimality of the build-up policy when there is no initial inventory in the system. We will discuss the case when there is initial inventory present in section 6.1. Use of the asterisk with a quantity indicates that the quantity is optimal.
Theorem 1 When demand is given by the modi ed Bass model (13), and when there is no initial inventory in the system, the optimal selling plan (speci ed by the optimal cumulative sales process S ( )) is a build-up plan. That is, there exists a time t 0 , which can be computed from the values of the market potential m, the coe cient of innovation p, the coe cient of imitation q and the production capacity c, such that the optimal cumulative sales S (t 0 ) = 0. Furthermore, S (t) = N (t) ? N (t 0 ) for all t > t 0 . That is, all lost sales are incurred only in 0; t 0 ].
We will use optimal control theory to establish this result via a sequence of lemmas. We will rst establish in Lemma 3 that in an optimal selling plan, the only acceptable choices for the instantaneous sales s(t) are 0, c, or the instantaneous demand n(t), and that an optimal policy switches between these choices only nitely many times. We do this by setting up the Hamiltonian for the optimal control problem and by arguing that it is a ne in the control s(t), in Lemma 3. Next, in Lemma 4 we show that after some time the optimal policy is guaranteed to meet all future demand. Using this, we argue in Lemma 5 that an optimal policy could have only been selling s (t) = 0 just before it begins meeting all future demand. Lastly, we argue that the beginning of this period over which the optimal policy was selling s (t) = 0 before meeting all future demand is in fact at t = 0 in Lemma 6. Thus, we establish that an optimal policy is of the build-up type. Finally, the switch over time (when the policy switches from selling nothing to meeting all future demand) is explictly computed in 7.
Lemma 3 The only possible choice for the optimal instantaneous sales s (t) are 0, c, or the instantaneous demand n (t). Furthermore, there are only nitely many switches between these choices.
Proof. We consider the optimal control problem (14-20). The Hamiltonian associated with this control problem is H = 1 (t)n(t) + 2 (t) ?pn(t) ? (q=m)n(t)S(t) + (q=m)(m ? N(t))s(t)] + 3 (t)s(t);
where i (t) for i = 1; 2; 3 are the co-state variables associated with the dynamics equations (15), (16), and (17) 
From the left hand inequality of (23) Then, from the right hand inequality of (22), we obtain the result.
2 Thus any optimal plan eventually switches to s (t) = n (t). In the sequel we will use the following de nition of t f under any given optimal policy. t f = inffs : n (t) < c; for all t sg:
Next we argue that a switch from s (t) = c to the eventual s (t) = n (t) is not optimal in Lemma 5. The basic idea of the proof is that a small perturbation of a policy that makes this switch results in a policy whose performance is no worse than that of the original policy. But, since the perturbed policy sells at levels other 0, c or n(t), it cannot be optimal by Lemma 3. Thus the c to n(t) switch is ruled out.
Lemma 5 Consider an optimal policy, and the corresponding t f as speci ed by (24).
Let t 0 = infft t f : s (t) = n (t)g. Then either t 0 = 0 or for every su ciently small, s (t 0 ? ) = 0:
Proof. Consider an optimal policy that sells at the capacity c from t 1 to t 0 . We will construct another policy for which s(t) = 0 for t 1 t t 2 . Further, s(t) = c for t 2 t t 3 and s(t) = n(t) for t t 3 , where t 3 is the smallest time beyond which the modi ed policy can sell all the demand. We show that such a sales plan is better than the supposedly optimal sales plan s (t) for which s (t) = c for t 1 t t 0 . Thus, a policy that makes the c to n transition in its instantaneous sales cannot be optimal. Consider t 2 su ciently small such that a feasible sales plan s(t) can be developed so that s(t) = 0 for t 1 t t 2 and N (t 2 ) > N(t 2 ). Now we prove the existence of such a t 2 . From the de nition of t 1 and the constraints on the control we know that S(t 1 ) = S (t 1 ) = ct 1 . Since the new policy sells zero amount from t 1 to t 2 the feasibility of the policy directly follows. Consider, N(t) = N (t) ? N(t) Consider t 3 such that s(t) = n(t) for t t 3 . Now, consider t 5 t 3 such that S(t 5 ) = ct 5 . Such a t 5 must exist because, if not, it would be possible to meet all future demand at a point earlier than t 3 . By de nition, S(t 5 ) S (t 5 ) because S (t 5 ) ct 5 . Note that t 3 t 0 because there is more inventory on hand in the modi ed policy (after time t 1 ), the time from which all demand is sold must be earlier. As a result, S(t 3 ) < S (t 3 ). Therefore, there must exist a point t 6 , t 3 t 6 t 5 such that S(t 6 ) = S (t 6 ). If N (t 6 ) N(t 6 ) then we are done because then N (t 6 ) ? S (t 6 ) N(t 6 ) ? S(t 6 ) and since no lost sales occur in the modi ed policy beyond t 3 this implies that S cannot be optimal.
Consider t 7 , t 2 t 7 t 6 where N(t 7 ) = N (t 7 ) and N(t) < N (t) for all t 2 t 2 ; t 7 ).
Note if no such t 7 existed then N (t In order to complete the proof, we establish the following claim that N(t) < N (t) for all t t 3 : Note that t 3 t 0 because there is more inventory on hand in the modi ed policy (after time t 2 ) and as a result the time from which all demand is sold must be earlier. Therefore, if * is optimal then S (t 4 ) S(t 4 ) which contradicts above inequality. So we must have N(t 3 ) < N (t 3 ). Now, as before consider N(t) for t > t 3 . Suppose (25) does not hold. Then there exists a t > t 3 such that N(t) = 0. Let t 6 := infft > t 3 : N(t) = 0g. At t = t 6 , since N(t 3 ) > 0, we must have @N @t = q 1 ? N (t 6 ) m ! S (t 6 ) ? S(t 6 )] < 0; which implies that S (t 6 ) < S(t 6 ) which contradicts the optimality of the supposed optimal policy because N(t 6 ) = N (t 6 ) and hence N(1)?S(1) = N(t 6 )?S(t 6 ) < N (t 6 )?S (t 6 ) N (t 0 )?S (t 0 ) = N (1)?S (1):
Thus (25) holds, and hence as argued before, the supposed optimal policy cannot be optimal if t 1 > 0. This establishes the result. 2
Lemma 6 above establishes that any optimal policy is a \buildup" policy. That is, there are no sales upto a time t 0 after which all the demand is met. The last unresolved issue in specifying an optimal policy is to give a procedure for explicitly computing the t 0 as speci ed by Lemma 5. We could reduce this to a one-parameter search problem, but we have a simpler way of doing this as described in the following Lemma. 
Proof. If (26) is satis ed, then in the unmodi ed Bass model, we must have N(t) < ct for all t > 0. Hence, there is always su cient capacity to meet the demand. Hence, there is no reason to avoid selling and S (t) = N(t) for all t > 0. Now consider systems that violate (26) at some t > 0. In this case, there will be lost sales, and that the modi ed Bass model applies. We know from the modi ed Bass model equation (13) where m and q are given by (29) and 30) respectively. Now the optimal choice of t 0 is one such that the inventory resulting from the buildup period is just depleted at the time when it is no longer needed. That time, of course, is t f , the time after which demand never exceeds production capacity. That is, we require that Also, note that at t f , n (t f ) = c. Recognizing that the dynamics of N are the same as the unmodi ed Bass model, and thus using Lemma 1 we obtain the result.
2 Thus, we have to solve a set of simultaneous non-linear equations to obtain both t 0 and t f . Alternately one can consider a class of policies parameterized by t 0 and optimize the objective function N(t f ) ? S(t f ) over this one parameter. For the parameter choices, considered in the previous example, namely p = 0:03, q = 0:4, m = 3000, and c = 50, we obtain t 0 = 16:6 and t f = 31:66. This explains why the build-up policy that sold nothing upto t = 17 in the previous example performed so well.
E ect of Changing Model Parameters
We conducted a limited computational study to understand the e ect of changes in di erent parameters on the optimal (lost) sales for p = 0:01; 0:02; 0:03; 0:04, q = 0:2; 0:3; 0:4; 0:5; 0:6, c = 10; 20; 30; 40; 50; 60 and m = 1000; 2000; 3000; 4000; 5000. We obtain the following insights.
We nd that all other factors being constant the fraction of lost sales is higher when (1) the immitator coe cient q is higher (see Figure 6) ; (2) lower (see Figure 4 , 5 and 6); (3) the market potential m is higher (see Figure 4) ; (4) the innovator coe cient p is higher (see Figure 5) . Most of these observations are intuitive. One expects the fraction of lost sales to be lower when capacity is higher. Similarly, if the coe cient of innovation p is higher, or market potential (in comparison to the capacity level c) is higher, more customers will show up in the buildup period resulting in higher lost sales. Finally at higher q the build up time is likely to be longer, since higher inventory levels are required to satisfy all future demand, again resulting in higher lost sales.
The fraction of lost sales decrease (as expected) with capacity, however, this e ect is di erent under di erent settings. (1) The e ect of increase in capacity on fractional lost sales is more predominant when the market potential (m) is lower (see Figure 4) . This can be explained as follows. When market potential is lower the bene t of an additional unit of capacity is much more (since that unit represents a larger fraction of the market potential). (2) The e ect of increase in capacity on fractional lost sales is more predominant when the coe cient of innovation (p) is lower (see Figure 5) . A plausible explanation could be that when p is low, an increase in capacity drastically reduces the amount of lost sales (since 
Variants and Extensions
In this section we discuss four generalizations and extensions of the model studied in this paper.
Initial Inventory and Delayed Roll-out
The optimal solution obtained for the modi ed Bass model can also be interpreted as a delayed roll out strategy. Basically, under such a strategy a rm may wait to accumulate enough inventory before bringing the product to market while possibly losing some of the total potential market m because of the delay. Note that in our 25 optimal policy derived in the previous section, during the build up period of length t 0 , the market potential reduces exponentially from m to m = m(1 ? e ?pt 0 ). So, one can interpret the build up time in the optimal policy, derived in the previous section, as the optimal roll-out delay in a setting where the market potential decreases in an exponential manner during the roll-out delay. In our model we assumed that the rm does not have any inventory on hand at time t = 0. An alternative problem could be posed as to how much inventory a rm should have at time t = 0 in order to avoid any lost sales during the product life. We can characterize this explicitly based on the following Lemma.
Lemma 8 Proof. Since there is no lost sale the demand process follows the classical Bass model.
The minimum amount of initial inventory required is such that at the time at which the rm runs out of inventory, the instantaneous demand falls to c and remains below c thereafter. That is, the rms ceases to need inventory just as it is depleted. From Lemma 1 the time t 2 at which the instantaneous demand falls to c and remains below c from thereon is given by the larger root of the equation c = mf p(p+q) 2 exp(?(p+q)t 2 ) (p+q exp(?(p+q)t 2 )) 2 g 2 . Further, the optimal amount of initial inventory chosen should be such that total production plus this inventory up to time t 2 , i 0 + ct 2 , should equal the cumulative demand until that time, which is given by N(t 2 ) = mf 1?exp(?(p+q)t 2 ) 1+ q p exp(?(p+q)t 2 ) g from Lemma 1.
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For the parameters considered for the example of section 5.1, p = 0:03, q = 0:4, m = 3000 and c = 50, we obtain t 2 = 13:5735 and i 0 = 2200:52 units. So the rm needs to have nearly 73% of its market potential available in initial inventory if it expects to meet all demand. Alternatively, one can think of this solution in terms of delaying roll-out. The rm needs to delay roll-out by i o =c = 44:01 time units if it expects to meet all demand. Note that this is much larger than the t 0 = 16:6 that we obtained in section 5.1. This is, of course, due to the fact that we have assumed that there is no degradation in market potential during the roll-out delay. Indeed, if there was degradation in market potential during roll-out delay, then we will obtain optimal roll-out delays somewhere between i o =c = 44:01 and t 0 = 16:6, since it is unreasonable to assume that the market potential degrades faster that exponential at rate p (which corresponds to not delaying roll-out at all and incurring lost sales instead). Developing appropriate models for market deterioration during roll-out delay to determine the optimal roll-out time is a subject of future work.
Choosing the Optimal Capacity
In our previous analysis we assume that the capacity c was given. In general, one would expect that the rm would utilize some estimate of demand in order to determine what capacity level to install. In the modi ed Bass model, such capacity decisions will depend on the sales plan that is employed, since the sales plan determines demand. The capacity decision may be made assuming either that the sales plan that will be used is myopic, or that the optimal buildup sales plan is used. We conducted a limited computational study (using the parameters described in the last subsection) to see how capacity decisions are di erent in these two settings. We assume that the cost of per unit capacity is $10 and the pro t per sale is $1 in Figure 7 . We can make two observations-(1) The optimal capacity sizing decisions could be quite di erent based on whether one used a myopic sales plan or the optimal buildup plan. (2) Interestingly, it seems that the myopic plan biases the decision towards installing a lower capacity level. The explanation for this e ect is that the marginal bene t of a unit of additional capacity drops at a higher capacity level in the buildup plan than it does for the myopic plan. This makes the optimal capacity level (chosen as the level at which the marginal bene t of adding capacity is equal to the marginal cost of doing so) lower with the myopic sales plan than with the buildup sales plan. From a managerial standpoint this indicates that if a rm utilized a myopic sales plan, not only will it end up with lower sales for the product at a given capacity, but also that it could end up choosing too little installed capacity, further exacerbating the negative e ects of the choice of sales plans. 
Competition
In the previous sections, we considered a monopolistic rm. Our prescription of holding o on sales appears less robust in the presence of competition. It is to be noted that in the classical Bass model there is no notion of competition since a product category is being modeled. However, one can naturally extend our model to a setting where two rms compete via innovative products that are substitutes for each other. In a such a case, even if one rm holds on to the product and builds inventory, the other rm could go to the market early and hence start generating demand which might force the rst rm to enter the market. Furthermore, losing sales in such a situation may generate negative word-of-mouth. That is, dissatis ed customers who were denied a sale by a rm may dissuade potential customers from attempting to purchase the product from that rm. While the modeling implications of the setting with competition are not clear, a simple extension of our model to this setting could be given follows. We consider two identical rms (i.e., with identical p, q and c) competing for the same potential market m. We assume at any time instant, customers who could not purchase the product from one rm will attempt to do so at the other rm. If unsuccessful there as well, they will leave the market. We also assume a negative word-of-mouth e ect as follows. We assume (S i (t) ? (N i (t) ? S i (t))) (m ? N 1 (t) ? N 2 (t)); where S i (t) is the cumulative sales, and N i (t) is the cumulative demand of rm i upto time t. quanti es the negative word-of-mouth e ect, that is proportional to the number of sales lost by the rm. Under the above competitive setting we present a numerical example to show that a build-up policy may still be attractive to a rm. As before, we take p = 0:03, q = 0:4 and c = 50. We choose a total market potential of m = 6000. We choose the negative word-of-mouth parameter to be = 0:5. Figure 8 illustrates the situation when one rm, Firm 1 decides to build up inventory for the rst t 0 = 9 time units while Firm 2 uses a myopic policy that sells as much as possible.
As can be seen in Figure 8 , despite obtaining a smaller market share, Firm 1 ends up selling more product, realizing total sales of S 1 (1) = 1761 units as opposed to Firm 2's sales of S 2 (1) = 1679 units. When both rms use a myopic policy, either rm realizes total sales of S 1 (1) = S 2 (1) = 1619 units. Thus, if one of the two identical rms in a duopoly chooses to use the myopic policy, then the other rm has incentive to unilaterally deviate from the myopic policy towards a build-up policy. This suggests that a buildup policy may be attractive even in a competitive setting and that a Nash equilibria is not likely to have both rms following a myopic policy.
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Pricing and Discounting
Although the classical model presented by Bass (1969) does not have the e ect of pricing on demand, several researchers have modi ed the model to capture pricing and advertising e ects. Such modi cations could be also be applied to our modi ed Bass model. For those settings, the build up policy seems to suggest that the prices should be kept high initially (so that less demand occurs) and once inventory is built up, prices can be reduced to ramp up demand.
In our model we neglect the time value of money. In settings where the e ect of the time value of money dominates (or when there are considerable nancial or physical costs of holding inventory), the build-up period will be shorter.
Limitations and Future Work
We have presented a new model of demand for innovative products that captures the e ect of supply constraints explicitly and have used this model to derive the optimal sales plans for monopolistic rms. These sales plans have a simple, intuitive structure, namely that of a build-up policy. We have also provided a brief illustration of the e ect of demand parameters and competition on the performance of the optimal policy and have discussed the implications of a sales plan on optimal capacity sizing decisions for the rm. We believe that the model and analysis in this paper bring out some of the key characteristics in marketing-manufacturing interplay within a rm at the tactical as well as strategic level. However, the setting studied in the paper has several shortcomings. (1) We ignore the time-value of money. This a ects the cost structure of the rm in two ways. First, since a rm incurs expense when it produces the products but generates revenue only when it sells the product, the rm incurs a nancial inventory holding cost. Second, since revenue generated in future periods is discounted, it is better to realize sales sooner. These e ects will tend to make build-up policies less than optimal. (2) Similar to the classical Bass model, we assume that there is no competition. This is de nitely a restrictive assumption. In the presence of competition, a rm would hesitate to deliberately lose customers to its competitor by denying them the chance to purchase its product. However, as we shown in Section 6 through a numerical example that even in such competitive settings, deliberately incurring lost sales may result in better performance. (3) Furthermore, we assume that the parameters that specify the e ect of mass-media as well as word-of-mouth, and the market potential are known and xed. This is also a restrictive assumption especially in light of the fact that our optimal policy requires the knowledge of these parameters. Moreover, we have taken price to be xed and exogeneous. These are shortcomings of the classical Bass model that we have inherited. The modi cations suggested to the Bass model in order to incorporate price and advertising are also applicable to our modi ed Bass model. (4) Finally, we assume that there is no randomness in the system. On a more minor note, we assume that the single product that the rm produces and sells is not discrete in nature, but is in nitely divisible, and solve our problem in continuous time. That is, at any non-integral instant of time, instantaneous demand, production, and sales can take non-integral values. We admit that analytical tractability is a consideration in the choice of assumptions. Since analysis is considerably challenging, even in this simple setting, and since the purpose of both proposing the modi cation of the Bass model and the optimal policy design for this modi ed model was meant to serve as a stepping stone towards the development of a more complete theory of marketing-manufacturing interaction, we feel that these assumptions are justi ed.
Relaxing several of the assumptions in this paper will be the subject of future work. First, theoretical investigation of the e ect of competition is necessary. Second, we plan to consider the case when the parameters that determine demand generation are unknown, especially in the setting where the realized demand observed by the rm is that generated by the model, corrupted by some stochastic noise. In this case, we will need to build adaptive versions of our policy that are able to learn the parameters while attempting to optimally control the system. Also, we plan to investigate more realistic cost structures, such as those that involve an instantaneous per unit holding cost h(t) at time t, and that take into account the time value of money.
